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Like Japan in the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China is currently facing economic 
growth measured in double-digit numbers. As both countries have faced, and continue to 
face, energy resource scarcity to feed their economic growth, they have reached out to the 
world to get these resources. 
How did Japan and how does today’s China ensure access to needed energy 
resources like oil and gas? How can these efforts be viewed according to international 
relations theory? Both countries use oil-producing companies, financial/development aid, 
and strong government support directly to domestic companies and within accompanying 
policies and negotiations to support their companies. The Japanese government tapped 
economic growth to become a global economic power, but is China more interested in 
using economic growth to maintain the ruling party’s power and the government itself? 
In terms of international relations theory, Japan and China show a realist approach in 
feeding their energy hunger, with the difference that Japan was and still is much more 
integrated into a variety of international organizations. This difference shows a bit of a 
liberal-institutional approach, but with realist goals set by the state. Although this thesis 
makes this comparison and applies international relations theory for a better insight into 
the economic development and long-term goals of Japan and China, it cannot specifically 
predict China’s future relationship with resource-rich countries and the international 
community. 
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This thesis will explore similarities and differences in the basis of economic 
growth and the rise to prominence of Japan and China. It will examine parallels in terms 
of two interconnected sets of consequences. The first is China’s need for resources like 
oil and gas and its outreach to the rest of the world (in and beyond Asia) to get these 
resources. Is China’s hunger for such resources comparable to Japan’s during its rapid 
development phase three decades earlier? Second, is there a difference in terms of how 
international relations theories can be applied to the behavior of the two countries, 
particularly toward neighboring countries? Both of these questions have important 
bearings upon the Western economies for their own interests and development and this 
thesis will also touch upon these issues. 
A. IMPORTANCE  
At the end of World War II, the world found itself divided into two opposing 
sides, with two different political systems. Not only did both sides participate in an arms 
race against each other, but competition also took place in terms of economic growth. 
During the ongoing Cold War, Asian nations sought to stimulate their economic growth 
in order to catch up with the Western economies, particularly those of the United States 
and West and Central Europe. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries all 
sought to accomplish this by taking over the roles of manufacturing and assembly for 
Western economic production. As one of the first countries to do so, Japan began its 
economic growth early on and soon leapfrogged over many of the older industrialized 
nations. It went so far as to necessitate agreements according to which the Japanese 
agreed to voluntarily reduce their exports (such as cars) in order to protect Western 
economies. 
Following the death of Mao Zedong in China, his successor, Deng Xiaoping, 
prepared and initiated an economic race to catch up with every other economy in the 
region and beyond. Since that time, economic growth of close to 10 percent annually has 
been achieved, lifting a third of the Chinese population out of poverty, the largest such 
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advancement observed thus far in the history of mankind. Its growth continues 
unchecked, and the ultimate outcome of this growth is impossible to predict.  
Along with this rapid growth comes an increasing hunger for resources to sustain 
further development and growth as well as to retain economic power itself. How does the 
Chinese government foster economic growth? What is China doing to feed its hunger for 
resources? Similarly, what did Japan do at the peak of its growth? Are there similarities 
to be found between the two nations? How is China handling its growing economic 
power with respect to its resourcing needs? Is this power being used purely for the 
welfare of the Chinese population or will China also use its power to influence its 
neighbors and other nations to keep its hunger for resources satisfied and its economy 
growing? Will China gain further influence to become a hegemon on the global economic 
and political stage? 
These questions are best examined by taking the political background of the 
People’s Republic of China into account. Officially one of the last communist regimes in 
the world (along with North Korea and Cuba), China was able to avoid collapse at the 
end of the 1980s when the Soviet Union and many of its satellite states abandoned 
communism for democracy. Led by a one-party-state with an authoritarian regime, how 
does the Chinese economy function? Are there differences between the Chinese and 
Japanese development trajectories, with a particular emphasis on resource needs? The 
thesis will, finally, consider the effects of Chinese and Japanese resource need on 
regional neighbors, as well as the potential implications for Western economies.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
To answer the question of whether China’s economic growth and its expansion 
into the global sphere are comparable to Japan’s growth of three decades earlier, I need to 
lay the theoretical foundation with regards to international relations to effectively 
measure the development of these two countries. Three specific international relations 
theories will form the background of this paper: power transition theory, a theory of 
interdependence or liberal institutionalism, and constructivism.  
 2 
Power transition theory, as a component of hegemonic realism,1 posits that war is 
likely to follow when one nation undergoes a leapfrogging development and thereby 
overtakes other countries, causing them to feel threatened by this development.2 The first 
hypothesis, according to this theory, would be that a war between China and Japan (or 
China and other economically powerful nations) would seem to be inevitable if China 
develops hegemonic interests. Chinese development, therefore, must be watched with 
caution, particularly because the new structures in the modern world, such as economic 
power, play the major role in international competition. Armed forces today support 
economic force rather than replace it, and therefore play only a subordinate role.3  
Liberal institutionalism argues that states with a common history and cultural 
background are capable of institutionalizing laws, norms, and rules.4 Furthermore the 
institutions of open markets and free trade foster stability and a peaceful coexistence.5 
Japanese development appears to have taken place while Japan was embedded in 
different international organizations, which made a Japanese hegemony interest rather 
unlikely. A second hypothesis, according to this second theory, would be that China’s 
outreach to the world, if engaged in without joining international systems, demonstrates 
clear hegemonic interests. An increasing contribution to and alignment with existing 
treaties, and perhaps the development of new alliances with China as the main player, 
might signal a different Chinese approach. 
The theory of constructivism claims that social behaviors (human interactions) 
affect international relations more than institutions, norms and laws, or natural structures 
1Jack S. Levy, “War and Peace,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 355.  
2Duncan Snidal, “Rational Choice and International Relations,” in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 
83.  
3John W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965), 142.  
4Andrew Hurrel, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,” in Handbook of International 
Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 
142. 
5Michael Haas, International Conflict (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), 317. 
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do.6 Martha Finnemore takes this idea even further, asserting that national interests are 
more likely to be met through interaction and communication than simply through 
discovery and exploitation.7 The third hypothesis, based on the theory of constructivism, 
would be that Chinese developmental interests and economic growth are formed by the 
economic performance of its neighbors and China’s outreach to the world is done in 
conformance with the nations and neighbors concerned.  
C. THEORIES 
These three theories differ in terms of their implications for the core research 
question in this thesis. Snidal, Levi, Burton and Organski state that war is inevitable if 
one nation, formerly poor and underdeveloped, begins to overtake developed countries. 
Since states will not passively accept a loss of power and influence, they are likely to 
start wars to sustain their global (or regional) positions. If this assertion proves accurate 
and the hypothesis correct, it would be careless to allow the Chinese to continue their 
path of development without insisting that they reform their political system just as they 
have reformed their economy. 
The international/institutional theory has been proposed and supported by Hurrel, 
Haas, and others. They believe, based on their observations, that states engaged with each 
other in alliances and treaties share similar cultural roots, or at least share similar legal 
systems, norms, and rules. Therefore, free markets and open economies, which tend to 
support this theory—as all players on the economic field must act according to the same 
rules—foster peace and cooperation. Therefore, if opportunities arise to engage China in 
an increasing number of alliances, its efforts to become a local or even global hegemon 
might be hampered and the associated threat towards Western economies could be 
avoided. 
The third theory, constructivism, is supported by Wendt and Finnemore. As the 
opposing theory to power transition theory, the bases of constructivism theory as it 
6Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 1.  
7Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1996), 2.   
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pertains to international relations are social interactions instead of laws, rules, or self-
interest. National interests, according to this theory, are a product of communication 
amongst states. According to this theory, there are no goals on the part of China to 
become a global or local hegemon if there is no other country claiming this role for itself.  
D. JAPAN 
The first country to be introduced in this thesis is Japan. As a late industrializer (it 
took its first steps towards industrialization with the Meiji Restoration during the second 
half of the nineteenth century), it experienced remarkable catch-up after World War II, 
with growth rates of up to 10 percent per year. After being halted by the oil crisis in 1973, 
the economy recovered and achieved a GDP growth rate of up to 3.5 percent annually.8 
McClain and Bernstein describe the growth of the Japanese economy since the mid-
twentieth century as seeming to be comparable to Chinese growth decades later. 
Although the war destroyed most Japanese industry, the nation’s pre-war knowledge and 
achievements helped it quickly rebuild the needed industrial infrastructure. As the old 
Zaibatsu-system was replaced by its successor, keiretsu organization, the Japanese 
economy was able to rely on old connections and retained a form of organization that 
provided economic incentives and a simple structure supporting bureaucratic and 
governmental control and steering.  
Chalmers Johnson highlights the role of the Japanese government in this 
economic miracle, as it was termed by Western media. With the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI), a governmental instrument, in charge, and with the support of 
the Ministry of Finance and various other ministries, the Japanese long-term ruling party, 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), was able to help Japan achieve this economic 
development. With the end of World War II, Japan became dependent on foreign 
economic help, especially from the U.S. With the outbreak of war in Korea, the Japanese 
economic system was supported with capital from the U.S. to meet the needs of the 
fighting forces in Korea. As McClain describes, this soon led to strong Japanese growth, 
which made the country a global economic giant with strong local trading connections.  
8James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: Norton & Company, 2002), 572. 
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Akao, Olsen, Ohkava, and Rosovsky describe the paucity of raw materials in 
Japan, which made it necessary for Japan to engage in various treaties and alliances to 
keep its supply lines open to import the needed raw materials. The share of these raw 
materials in terms of total percentage of Japanese imports reached more than 70 percent 
in 1965,9 and their nonappearance was seen as a threat to further economic growth. To 
sustain economic growth, it was important to continuously purchase and import these raw 
materials. The country’s dependency on these imports was best demonstrated when the 
oil crises of 1973 and at the beginning of the 1980s occurred. Olsen describes the 
vulnerability of the Japanese economic system, as it was unable to function on a self-
sufficient basis.10 But as described in the White Paper on Japanese Economy 1984, the 
amount of foreign direct investment to develop resources was declining, as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) shares were increasing in manufacturing industries in advanced nations, 
which shows a change in the Japanese approaches in the mid-1980s.11 
It will be shown in this thesis that the Japanese approach in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s hews most closely to realist theoretical ideas, as Japan’s foremost goal was 
the state’s survival and furthermore to become a global economic power, leaving the 
Western industrialized nations behind. With the conditions on developmental aid, to buy 
Japanese products and knowledge further showed a protectionist approach, which can be 
assessed as a realist theory perception. But with the early integration in varying 
international organizations and the strong ties with the U.S., there are still some elements 
that a liberal-institutional theoretical approach makes clearer.  
E. CHINA 
With the death of Mao Zedong and the establishment of Deng Xiaoping as the 
new leader in China, the country began its economic growth process (Guthrie, Guo, et 
al.), which seems to be unique among nations. The existing literature describes the 
economic development of China as outstanding, with the Chinese government and its 
9Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the 
Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), 188. 
10Edward A. Olsen, Japan: Economic Growth, Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Constraints, 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 63.  
11White Paper on Japanese Economy 1984 (Tokyo: Business Intercommunications, 1984), 80.   
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entrepreneurs able to sustain a growth in GDP by 9 percent over the last two and a half 
decades.  
Guthrie describes the micro-setting for this economic development, having been 
initiated by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (e.g., dual-track/market-price system, local 
township enterprises, and special economic zones), in terms of how it laid the foundation 
for this growth.12 The step-by-step reform process directed by the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) since 1979 proved successful, and the change from an agricultural 
collectivized economy into being the world’s power- and production-house lifted huge 
portions of the Chinese population out of poverty. Guo’s examination of this 
development focuses more on interregional differences and their associated challenges 
and the overall increased need for resources, raw materials, and energy.13 To change the 
economic system from a command and planned Soviet-style economy into a market-
oriented economy, and to change from a rural, agriculturally driven economy to an 
industrialized urban economy, an increase in energy and raw material consumption was 
inevitable. In addition, it seems to have been important for the CCP to sustain this 
economic growth to stay in power, as all literature sources assert. Taking this into 
account, the Chinese need for resources is not only driven by economic demands per se, 
but further by party demands to keep the population employed, satisfied, and therefore 
calm and peaceful.  
Ear and Cáceres specifically point to the Chinese hunger for resources, especially 
concerning crude oil.14 The Chinese need for resources is increasing as its growing 
industrialization and motorization enhances the need for fossil fuel energy carriers, 
primarily oil. Furthermore, these researchers emphasize the geopolitical implications of 
this development. As the Chinese approach to pursuing resources differs from the 
approach of the Western old economies, there are expected difficulties and 
12Doug Guthrie, “China and Globalisation,” in The Political Economy Reader: Markets and 
Institutions, eds. Naazneen H. Barma and Steven K. Vogel (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2008), 399‒
423. 
13Rongxing Guo, How the Chinese Economy Works: A Multiregional Overview (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999).  
14 Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres,and Sophal Ear, The Hungry Dragon: How China’s Resource Quest Is 
Reshaping the World (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013).  
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negotiations.15 The U.S. and the European countries are concerned with political 
developments in the oil producing countries and regularly point to the Washington 
Consensus as being a recipe for achieving economic growth and prosperity. The Chinese 
government has always emphasized its non-interference with national political challenges 
and differences. The best example of this is Angola; while the Western world wanted 
political reforms and more transparency concerning corruption before any credit was 
given to rebuilding the country after its devastating civil war, China offered a high value 
credit to the country without any caveats or conditions.  
The Chinese growth of the last several decades has been the subject of a variety of 
research studies and books. The development of and the need for a first technological 
transfer into China, the subsequent economic growth, and the change from an agricultural 
economy to a highly industrialized economy is described in detail by different authors. 
The last several years have seen an increased interest in the Chinese resource hunger and 
its influence and outreach in the world. Although China does have various metal 
resources, compared to its population, these are relatively small, and the lack of 
availability of sufficient fossil fuel resources to feed its energy hunger makes its search 
for foreign deposits inevitable. As these resources are required by every industrialized 
economy or society, there is rigorous competition to gain access to them. The Chinese 
approach to pursuing resources differs from the approaches used by the old economies, 
which frequently makes the Chinese a more feasible trading partner, as it does not make 
its assistance contingent caveats and conditions that the resource-producing countries 
might not want to be burdened by.  
China does not have any liberal-institutional theory approach in his ways to get 
access to foreign resources. Even if there is no interest to become a regional or global 
hegemon, as this is denied on varying occasions by Chinese officials,16 the accumulation 
of economic power and the need to sustain this growth by sufficient energy supplies is 
important. Although the Chinese military modernization effort is not part of this paper, it 
currently shows the transfer from latent power into effective power. So economically the 
15Ibid.  
16Andrew,Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 30. 
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realist theory best explains the Chinese resource activities. If and when they might use 
the military to become a regional hegemon is hard to predict. Their ways to get access to 
foreign resources show at least less interest in issues such as human rights, authoritarian 
systems, or civil wars, if the needed resources are in a particular country. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The thesis is a comparative study. The two Asian economic giants, Japan and 
China, will be compared with regards to their economic development, the roles their 
government played and still play in their economic development, and finally how their 
outreach efforts to the world to gain resources (and the influence necessary to secure 
these) differ or are similar. Japan is clear to identify on a map. With respect to China, this 
thesis examines the People’s Republic of China and will not include Taiwan; therefore, 
the terms China and the People’s Republic of China (or PRC) are used interchangeably. 
This research does not involve human subjects. The sources for this paper are exclusively 
books and articles. As the sources describing Japanese development, in particular, are 
older (as its economic miracle took place in the second half of the twentieth century and 
its economy since the Asian financial crisis in 1997 has slowly recovered), the sources 
for China will be more recent literature, as Chinese energy security needs are subject to 
current varying studies.  
As this paper looks more into the tools and means used by Japan in the 1970s and 
1980s and compares them with those the People’s Republic of China uses currently, only 
a few statistics are provided. The aim is to show the use of the tools themselves, as 
numbers cannot explain these. Due to the different times when both countries started their 
economic leapfrogging, the different size of those economies, the opacity especially for 
Chinese numbers might compare the varying amounts of oil, gas, or money both 
countries needed and used. But they cannot explain the means and the tools both 
countries used to get access to resources or get them for their economies. 
G. OUTLINE 
After this introduction, the Chapter II contains the theoretical background 
concerning the international relations theories being applied in this thesis and the 
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hypotheses resulting from these theories. In Chapter III and Chapter IV, the economic 
development of the two countries (China and Japan, respectively), the role of their 
governments, and their access to energy resources like oil and gas are described. Both 
chapters are similar in their structure. The tools of oil-producing companies, 
financial/development aid, and governmental support will be highlighted, as these are the 
elementary means for both countries to get access to foreign resources. For all cases 
examples are included. While in the chapter on Japan they are integrated within the 
chapter, this topic gets its own case-study section in the chapter on China. As China is 
more diversified with its supplying countries, the People’s Republic of China uses 
varying methods in different countries, whereas the Japanese approach has focused on 
one area in the world.  
Chapter V compares both countries according to the same structure used in the 
previous parts. Oil-producing companies are compared first, followed by 
financial/developmental aid, and finally governmental support. The comparison is done 
by looking into similarities and differences between the two countries. Furthermore, their 
approaches are compared with respect to the international relations theories mentioned in 
the Chapter II. It is shown that the power-transition theory (and its underlying realism 
theory), and the liberal-institutional theory can be recognized within the two countries’ 
approaches. The constructivist theory is more difficult to identify within the countries 
ways to get access to the needed resources. Only the Chinese copying of loan-for-oil- 
deals can be seen as a Constructivist approach, as the Japanese imposed those deals on 
China, and they copied that way later. More than that there is no further clear systemic or 
organizational influence to recognize, which could affect either of the two countries in 
the way they try to get access to the needed resources. Chapter VI concludes the thesis 
with a summary of the research as well as considers the challenges of predicting China’s 




II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES 
To answer the question of whether Chinese economic growth and its expansion 
into the global world are comparable to Japan’s growth of three decades earlier, and if 
this development implies hegemonic Chinese interests, I need to lay the theoretical 
foundation with regards to international relations to effectively measure the development 
of these two countries using the relevant theories. Three specific international relations 
theories will form the background of this paper: the power transition theory, the liberal 
international/institutional theory, and the constructivism theory. While the realism theory 
will be explained at length in the following pages, the liberal-institutional theory and the 
constructivism theory warrant briefer treatment. The realism theory in its facets is the 
oldest theory of all and has a lot more core assumptions as its base, and thus needs more 
description. Liberal institutionalism and later constructivism are more recent, in terms of 
this paper; therefore, the explanation of these theories can be kept shorter. Especially the 
constructivism theory as a follow-on development of the institutional theory only takes 
the hypothesis further. 
The first section will explain the realist theory. Here the international anarchic 
setting and the core state’s interests of survival and increase in power to become a 
hegemon (at least regionally), according to John J. Mearsheimer, will be explained first. 
In addition to these core assumptions, A. F. K. Organski’s idea of power transition will 
be described, as this theory seems to indicate best how the economic development of the 
People’s Republic of China can be perceived and assessed. While Organski theoretically 
sees the chance of a forceful containment of the challenger by the status-quo power, he 
looks into history to claim that this has never happened; rather, the challenger has 
typically started a war to change the international situation to become the powerful 
hegemon. Jack S. Levi assumes that the containment war started by the status-quo power 
is as possible as the way described by Organski. The hypothesis that comes out of this 
theory is that China’s economic growth, like Japan’s three decades earlier, will ensure the 
state’s survival and give it the chance to become a regional hegemon in Asia. All efforts 
by the state are taken to achieve this goal; therefore, the other Asian countries and the old 
industrialized Western nations will be challenged by this development. 
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In the second part of this chapter the liberal-institutional theory is explained. As 
institutions fulfill different tasks, the roles of international organizations are particularly 
important for this paper. International institutions can and do influence countries within 
the international architecture. State interests can be changed to conform to international 
norms and laws, and therefore, these institutions can influence a nation to the benefit of 
all other nations. Especially Bruce Russett and John O’Neal evaluate empirically the role 
of institutions and their function in providing peace and development. According to this 
theory, the hypothesis is that an integration of the People’s Republic of China into 
different organizations will help to influence its behavior in a way that the global 
community and the PRC get the biggest possible benefits out of this development. As 
Japan after 1945 was integrated into international organizations, its growth did not lead 
again to an imperial Japan, which had entered World War II to exceed its sphere of 
influence. 
The third explained theory is not seen as a separate theory by its chief-proponents 
Alexander Wendt and Martha Finnemore. Being complementary to the previously 
explained theories rather than separate from and fully comparable to them, the 
constructivism approach takes institutionalism further. While within the idea of liberal-
institutionalism states do have their own interests and seek to follow and achieve them, 
the constructivist view implies that these interests do not arise from the states’ side. 
These interests rather come into existence as states communicate and interact with each 
other, and as a result of this interaction, state interests are defined. The hypothesis posed 
by this approach is that the Chinese development is already formed through interaction 
with other states within the international community and therefore does not need to be 
perceived as a threat to the rest of the world. China has no hegemonial interests and its 
economic growth is set up for the benefit of all. 
A. REALISM/POWER TRANSITION THEORY 
The first theory I will lay out in this paper is the power transition theory, which 
was formulated by A. F. K. Organski and later described in more detail by Jack S. Levy 
and others. As a part of the hegemonial realism theory, I will first give some background 
information about realism and its development by describing the balance-of-power-
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theory, as explained by Kenneth Waltz. Then, I trace the development of hegemonial 
powers, as explained by John Mearsheimer, and finally the power-transition-theory as a 
following realist approach to explain why confrontations between states occur and how 
they could be predicted and, therefore, be prevented. 
The global state structure is an anarchic system, which does not mean that it is 
mere chaos. Instead, it means no government oversees all states to regulate and enforce 
laws guiding states’ behavior.17 In this anarchic structure states seek to maximize their 
own power at the cost of other states. Since there is no super-government above the states 
to help them prevent other states from engaging in such behavior, they seek a balance of 
power to ensure their own survival. Waltz names the international system therefore as a 
system of self-help,18 since every nation has to help itself, to achieve its goals and 
survive. Furthermore, it is not a matter of maximizing power rather than balancing (or 
sometimes even bandwagoning) with others.19  
Mearsheimer goes further than Waltz in stating that every state seeks to maximize 
its own power to become a hegemonial power: “In short, states do not become status quo 
powers until they completely dominate the system.”20 After securing their own survival 
as the first and most important goal,21 states will make use of all possibilities to change 
the previously mentioned balance-of-power at the cost of other states. In doing so, they 
“employ a variety of means—economic, diplomatic, and military—to shift the balance of 
power in their favor.”22 For his theoretic approach Mearsheimer delineates two types of 
power, latent power and effective power. While latent power is formed by the means 
which a state has at its disposal including technology, wealth, population, and so forth, 
effective power means the military assets which are available.23 Both forms of power are 
17Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 
1979), 103, 104; and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 2001), 30.  
18Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111.  
19Ibid., 127. 
20 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 35. 
21 Ibid., 31. 
22 Ibid., 34. 
23 Ibid., 55. 
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strongly intertwined, as latent power can be transformed into effective power.24 He does 
not mention how long this will take or when states decide on which type of power to 
focus, but still these types of power are used by states to achieve their goals.  
What Mearsheimer does not answer is the question of how the transition of power 
takes place. The examples in his book describe the ideal types of a state’s development 
into a hegemonial power, and once this goal is achieved, the hegemon tries to maintain a 
status quo to avoid its own position being challenged.25 
A. F. K. Organski provides an explanation for this power transition in his book 
World Politics. Organski describes slightly different goals states seek to achieve, 
including power and wealth (as the two most important ones), culture, and peace.26 His 
identified means of power are also different and separate from those Mearsheimer 
mentions. For Organski population, political structure, economic development, national 
morale, resources, and geography constitute a state’s power.27 States will use these 
different kinds of power, depending how they are available to them, to increase their 
position in the global system. He criticizes Waltz’s balance-of-power theory and 
contributes to Mearsheimer’s position that states seek to maximize their power to become 
a hegemon. To achieve this, states have to pass three stages of development and power 
transition. The first stage is the “stage of potential power,”28 where the state has 
previously mentioned forms of power at its disposal, but does not use them to increase its 
overall position. The potential of the country is there, but still the country is in a pre-
industrial phase.29 In the following step the state uses the powers at its disposal to 
become an industrialized state and therefore enters the “stage of transitional growth in 
power.”30 Finally, the state reaches the “stage of power maturity,”31 which means that 
24 See Klaus Knorr, The War Potential of Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956). 
25 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 35. 
26 Alfred F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: A. F. Knopf, 1960), 56. 
27 Organski, World Politics, 197‒201. 
28 Ibid., 302. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 303. 
31 Ibid., 304. 
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the industrialization is fully developed, and technological development takes place and 
increases economic efficiency.32  
Just as important as these stages of development, Organski names typologies for 
states, as it seems to determine their behavior. Here he divides countries among 
“powerful and satisfied, powerful and dissatisfied, weak and satisfied,” and “weak and 
dissatisfied” categories.33 While the latter do not have the means to change their situation 
much, the former two are the decisive factors in the power transition theory. Since it 
would be a nation’s suicide to challenge a powerful state at the top without enough means 
and power to do so successfully, a challenger will attempt to change the international 
system through war and become the hegemon, when the challenger has achieved nearly 
the same amount of power as the leading state.34 While Organski sees the chance that the 
challenged hegemon, normally a powerful and satisfied state, feels challenged by 
newcomers and therefore tries to contain them; parallels in history have shown that the 
challengers started the wars.35 But Jack S. Levy argues again for both origins of war, as 
there is the challenger, for Organski the powerful-dissatisfied state and for Levy the 
revisionist state, which tries to achieve a hegemonial position and therefore starts a war 
against the current hegemon.36 On the other side, states which are interested in securing 
their actual position and maintaining the status-quo, try to contain the challenger.37 
Realist power-transition theory assumes that there is a state with increasing 
powers, be they economic—as part of the latent potential, or military—as a mean of 
effective power, which is leapfrogging with its development the established hegemon. As 
the emerging power becomes stronger it might start a war against the hegemon to take 
over its position and become the new hegemon. This war will not happen before a more 
or less equal distribution of power is achieved, as a war out of a position of weakness 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 326‒330. 
34 Ibid., 333. 
35 Organski, World Politics, 333. 
36 Jack S. Levy, “War and Peace,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter 
Carlsnaes,Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons  (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 353. 
37 Levy, “War and Peace,” 353. 
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would be more suicidal than helpful. On the other hand, power-transition theory implies 
that there is a chance that the challenged hegemon sees the emerging power as a danger 
to its position and contains the challenger’s development by war. This act needs to 
happen earlier, as the logic behind the first case, equal power means a bigger chance to 
overcome the current hegemon, is reversed in this case. The stronger the challenger gets, 
the greater the risk that the status-quo power could lose a possible war and, as a 
consequence, its position. In times where latent power, instead of effective power, seems 
to have become more important as a power itself, it seems to play a more and more 
subordinated role.38  In such cases, economic growth and, therefore, growing power can 
be already perceived as a threat, long before the latent power is transferred into military 
means. 
Out of this theory the first hypothesis for this paper derives that the fast 
development of today’s China and its needs for resources will be seen as its power 
increases to first achieve state survival and later to achieve the role of a hegemon, 
whether regionally or even globally. As all industrialized nations need energy to sustain 
economic development, the competition for these resources on the global market affects 
policies and politics, and states’ behavior to get access to or to prevent others from 
accessing these resources. If this is the case for both countries, Japan and China, their 
economic growth and performance was (and, in the case of China, is) pushed to revise the 
current order and to achieve a leading—and therefore powerful—position in the 
international system. 
B. LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM 
This section looks more closely at liberal institutionalism, as the growing 
interdependencies and international institutions seem to play a more and more important 
role in the system of international relations. As democratic peace theory is one part of the 
liberalism theory, the role of institutions has become the subject of different scholars and 
even led to the emergence of constructivism, which will be dealt with later in this 
chapter. Since the beginning of the twentieth century the number of international 
38 John W. Burton, International Relations: A General Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965), 142. 
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organizations has been constantly growing.39 Even if some have entered the global stage 
and disappeared within two decades,40 the numbers and importance of these 
organizations has seemed to grow. As Andrew Hurrell puts it, “central to the ‘system’ is a 
historically created, and evolving, structure of common understandings, rules, norms, and 
mutual expectations,”41 which gives the additional function, international organizations, 
or better institutions, do play. Especially the last mentioned point of “mutual 
expectations”42 will play a more important role in the constructivism part; the other parts 
explain what is expected from international organizations. These shared values affect 
states within these institutions to act according to laws and rules, set as a framework, by 
contracts for a long-term sustainability of cooperation.43  
Within these contracts, international institutions can fulfill different functions, as 
there are “coercing norm-breakers, mediating among conflicting parties, reducing 
uncertainty by conveying information, problem-solving, including expanding states’ 
conception of their self-interest to be more inclusive and longer term, socialization and 
shaping norms, and generating narratives of mutual identification.”44 These functions can 
work on the use of force, where these institutions might reduce a state’s interest in using 
force instead of using the institution and its capabilities to get problems solved.45 Liberal 
markets and trade can support these institutions and, furthermore, a peaceful international 
architecture.46 And while economic issues can support institutions, they can in the same 
way be taken to make use of the six functions mentioned earlier. Economic sanctions can 
put coercive pressure on the norm-breaker, inside and outside the institution. Current 
international sanctions against regimes in the world, such as North Korea or the Iran due 
39 Bruce Russett and John O’Neal, Traingulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and  
International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001), 160. 
40 Russett and O’Neal, Triangulating Peace, 160. 
41 Andrew Hurrel, “Norms and Ethics in International Relations,” in Handbook of International 
Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 
2002), 142. 
42 Hurrel, “Norms and Ethics,” 142. 
43 Russett and O’Neal, Triangulating Peace, 160. 
44 Ibid., 163‒166. 
45 Ibid., 166. 
46 Michael Haas, International Conflict (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1974), 317. 
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to their nuclear programs, are institutionalized economic measures against norm-
breakers. Institutional integration can affect a states’ economy and make integration an 
achievable and attractive goal, e.g., the People’s Republic of China entering the World 
Trade Organization and thus opening the institution’s benefits for China’s economy. It 
may also “accelerate domestic reforms by introducing external pressures.”47 The WTO is 
just one international institution to foster economic interdependence and increase the 
cooperation between states. The Bretton Woods organizations, among them the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, play another important global role to 
support economic development in various ways.48 Overall institutions seem to play a 
more and more important role for economic development, liberalization, and finally a 
more peaceful world.49  
Out of the liberal-institutional theory the second hypothesis is deduced that an 
integration of China in more international organizations makes it possible to streamline 
China’s development according to international norms, laws, and to the benefit of the 
global economy. Chinese interests can be influenced, potential hegemonialism can be 
contained, and their development would not pose a threat to other states. 
C. CONSTRUCTIVISM 
An enhancement to the liberal-institutionalism theory is constructivism theory, as 
elaborated by Martha Finnemore and Alexander Wendt. Finnemore assumes in her book 
National Interest in International Society that states do not know their particular interests. 
These are developed through interactions in social (international) structures. She uses 
three different cases: UNESCO to develop national bureaucracies for scientific issues, the 
development of the Geneva Convention and the implementation in a growing number of 
states after its declaration, and finally the World Bank and its change in development aid 
policies, which helped to increase the economic growth of developing states.50 According 
47 Wang Yong, “China in the WTO: A Chinese View,” The China Business Review 33, no. 5, 
(Sept./Oct. 2006): 44.  
48 Russett and O’Neal, Triangulating Peace, 168. 
49 Compare the overall results in Russett and O’Neal, Triangulating Peace.   
50 See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 1996).  
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to this theory, states do not have their own interests and incentives to work for and 
achieve certain goals beside those given by international society and organizations. 
However, Finnemore and Wendt do not see constructivism as a stand-alone theory that 
should and can be compared with other theories like realism or liberalism; rather, it is an 
addition to and integral part of the other two theories.51 While Finnemore does not 
explicitly mention institutions as the crucial interest-provider for states, all her cases 
mention international organizations, which finally formulated the interests states later 
acquired as their own.52 So the biggest difference between institutionalism and 
constructivism by itself is that states in the first case have their own defined interests, 
which they follow. In the latter, these interests are not self-defined.  
The hypothesis emerging from this theory would go further than the one derived 
from the institutionalism theory. The Chinese economic growth on its own is already a 
result of social interaction between China and the international community. Therefore, 
their development need not be seen as a threat, and by defining more norms and laws, 
Chinese behavior can further be strongly influenced and directed by the international 
society.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has served to outline the theoretical background for this thesis. 
Which international relations theories will give the foundation for the following 
comparison between today’s China and Japan of three decades ago? Both countries have 
(or had) to reach out to other countries to secure important raw materials, in particular, oil 
and gas as energy providing resources.  
The following chapters will examine the economic development and the outreach 
of Japan at the peak of its growth and China currently for natural resources like oil and 
gas and will show how these two countries behaved according to these theories. Is there a 
difference in the two approaches, is their economic development supported by these 
51 Finnemore, National Interests, 27; and James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. 
Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, 
Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE Publications, 2002), 56. 
52 See Finnemore, National Interests, Chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
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ideas? What do the case of Japan and the case of China tell us about these countries’ 
intentions? To answer these questions, the next chapter will begin by explaining Japan’s 
development and its outreach for needed resources, particularly oil and gas, for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
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III. JAPAN 
This chapter highlights the Japanese economy’s development and the resulting 
need for resources, especially oil and gas, at the peak of the Japanese economic catch-up 
period in the 1970s. As these energy-rich resources are needed to keep a growing 
economy running, there are different actions needed to get access to these supplies. The 
following sections will show that Japan’s international goals after its defeat in World War 
II were to become a global economic power. To achieve this goal, the Japanese 
government supported strongly economic development and provided policies to achieve 
economic growth to reach this goal. This quite realistic approach was embedded in 
international institutions, as Japan entered those institutions during the 1950s. At least 
those institutions, formed by the Western countries to streamline economic efforts and 
support economic growth in the West, could support their members’ efforts according to 
the means mentioned in Chapter II of this thesis. 
Japan used three main tools to get access to foreign resources. The first was the 
use of oil companies, as well as trading companies, to extract oil in oil-rich countries or 
to purchase it on the world market. As this approach aimed to reduce the dependence on 
the energy world market, a Japanese government agency was established to support and 
streamline those efforts. Parallel to the oil-producing companies, which were formed 
mostly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, financial support was provided either to the 
newly formed companies or directly for the oil-rich countries. This form of financial 
support consisted of cheap loans and credit, and private funding. The third, and most 
important, tool was government support, as the first two tools would be too weak without 
strong government backing. MITI, as the responsible ministry for economic issues and 
development, provided guidance for all economic-related questions and decisions. 
Furthermore it streamlined and focused efforts using the other two tools. In addition to 
the ministry and its efforts, direct government action through diplomacy was taken to 
support and maintain the needed energy supply. Negotiations at the level of country 
leaders were used to open doors into resource-rich countries and provide access to these 
resources.  
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The next section will give a short overview of Japanese economic development. 
The sections after that will highlight the three different tools, first the autonomous 
development approach by oil-companies, followed by financial aid. Finally, 
governmental support will be explained to complete the description of the tools used.  
A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century was placed in a far off corner of 
the world, where nobody would have expected this country to play a major economic role 
one century later.53 Beginning with the Meiji Restoration in 1868 Japan started to catch 
up with Western, already industrialized, nations54 and consequently followed the goal to 
become better and more advanced than the Western nations.55 Since its first steps toward 
industrialization Japan showed a willingness to adapt Western technologies and use them 
for its own benefit and economic growth.56 Ohkava and Rosovski identified different 
circles of development, but see the ones that started at the beginning of the twentieth 
century as the most important.57 Until World War I this development was financed by 
governmental investments, since there was a lack of private investors and a strong 
governmental incentive to increase the military power of the formerly backward and 
isolated country.58  
Even in these first economic development steps Japan faced resource scarcity and 
was therefore forced to acquire needed resources elsewhere. This led to a growing 
Japanese imperialism, militarism, and finally participation in World War II.59 The 
building of the Japanese Empire aimed for the position of regional hegemon and 
therefore would have led to access to resource-rich countries to achieve resource 
53 Kazushi Ohkawa and Henry Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth: Trend Acceleration in the 
Twentieth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), 2. 
54 Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, 3. 
55 Nobutoshi Akao, “Introduction,” in Japan´s Economic Security, ed. Nobutoshi Akao (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 2. 
56 Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, 3. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., 16. 
59 Ibid., 7. 
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security.60 This very realistic approach ended with the defeat of the Japanese forces and 
the occupation of Japan by U.S. Forces, which in reality controlled the country during the 
first years after the war.61 With its defeat and following occupation, Japan accepted a 
new constitution, abandoning “war as a sovereign right of the nation and forgoing the 
maintenance of armed forces (Article 9).”62  
At the beginning of the 1950s, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and 
the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty, which provided military security for Japan, instead of 
only being neutral.63 With these military security set up for Japan, its  declared goals 
were to become prosperous and economically secure, and to regain its reputation as a 
leading world power.64 Since military security was provided by a strong ally, economic 
security became more important for Japan.65 Olsen puts it more precisely when he states 
that Japanese economic development after World War II was strongly influenced by the 
strong Japanese-U.S. ties, but the drive and motivation behind the fast development was 
singularly provided and done by the Japanese.66 The United States supported Japanese 
development further by integrating Japan into various international organizations, some 
supporting economic development. Thus, in 1952 Japan joined the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 
1955, the United Nations in 1956, and finally the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development in 1964.67 Through this integration Japan sought to gain 
access to the global markets for its own goods.68 After the first oil-crisis Japan joined 
another international organization in 1973, the International Energy Agency (IEA) with 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 2. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ohkawa and Rosovsky, Japanese Economic Growth, 2. 
64 Frank C. Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1973), 2. 
65 Akao, “Introduction,” 6. 
66 Edward A. Olsen, Japan: Economic Growth, Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Constraints 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 10. 
67 Akao, “Introduction,” 3. 
68 Ibid. 
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the incentive of a more institutionalized way to provide energy security.69 This strong 
involvement in several different international organizations shows strong institutional 
approaches from the Japanese side. Hence, there seems a shift from realism towards 
liberal-institutionalism. How did Japan reach out for resources, as they were important 
for its economic growth and resource scarcity was an ongoing issue? 
The postwar economic growth, which began in the 1950s and 1960s, was focused 
on heavy and chemical industries, and hence was accompanied by an increased need for 
raw materials.70 Material producing and refining industries like steel, oil, petrochemical, 
and aluminum with the same time development of higher advanced technological 
industries like cars, ships, and electronics became the backbone of Japan’s economic 
power.71 In the years between 1960 and 1970 the need for oil in particular increased by 
20.4 percent, while the need for natural gas grew by 16.9 percent.72 Oil had the highest 
importance, as it was the primary energy resource and therefore counted for nearly 70 
percent of energy needs. The rest was covered by coal and gas.73 This high dependence 
on oil made the country vulnerable to shortcuts and breakdowns in delivery, as almost all 
oil was imported.74 In addition to this vulnerability, there was no diversification in 
providing countries; about three-quarters of the needed oil was imported from the Middle 
East. As a close ally of the United States, this relationship threatened the Japanese energy 
supply even more, as this bore further political challenges with its policy implications 
that alliance could bring with it.75 Especially the two oil crises in 1973 and 1978/79 
increased Japanese efforts to achieve as much energy security as possible with different 
means.76 These means were used before these crises, too, but after the first incident and 
69 Valerie Yorke, “Oil, the Middle East and Japan’s Search for Security,” in Japan’s Economic 
Security, ed. Akao Nobutoshi (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 55. 
70 Nobutoshi Akao, “Resources and Japan´s Security,” in Japan’s Economic Security, ed. Akao 
Nobutoshi (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 15. 
71 Akao, “Resources and Japan´s Security,” 39. 
72 Akao, “Resources and Japan´s Security,” 16. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Yorke, “Oil, the Middle East,” 52. 
76 Ibid. 
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its impacts on the Japanese economy, Japan started its “resource diplomacy”77 to strive 
for energy security. 
What was part of this form of diplomacy? How did Japan try to secure its energy 
supply? These are key questions as energy security was of foremost importance for 
maintaining Japan’s economic growth and therefore achieving the goal of becoming more 
powerful economically than its Western competitors. The following section will identify 
the four different ways Japan employed resource diplomacy and attempted to gain energy 
security. The first is entry into yet another international organization, although other steps 
were more fundamental as they were taking direct action on the Japanese side to get 
access to foreign oil, gas, and other resources. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the measures taken was joining the IEA, which was 
supposed to streamline the industrialized nations’ efforts to gain energy security, as all of 
them were affected by the first oil crisis.78 Part of this effort was trying to develop the 
solution to energy-related differences between member states, and the establishment of a 
future strategy to diminish the negative influence on coming production and price 
crisis.79 In addition to these measures, Japan agreed to stockpile reserves, to reduce its 
own imports in case of a shortfall in supplies, and therefore to relax the overall effects on 
the global energy market.80 Finally, amongst the members of the IEA there was supposed 
to be cooperation on how to conserve energy and develop alternative resources to further 
reduce the impacts of future energy crisis.81 The formation of such an international 
organization showed the impact the first oil crisis had on the industrialized nations. Those 
that were dependent on oil-producing countries, due to their own resource scarcity, had a 
particularly strong interest in the IEA and its efforts. But Japan did not leave it to the IEA 
alone; further means were used to secure access to foreign energy resources. Three major 
tools can be identified here.  
77 Ibid., 51. 
78 Ibid., 55. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Yorke, “Oil, the Middle East,” 55. 
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B. OIL-PRODUCING COMPANIES 
“Autonomous development” described the Japanese attempt to use their own oil 
companies to get access to foreign sources. Between 1968 and 1974 the number of oil 
producing companies increased from one up to 49.82 These companies formed ventures 
in oil-producing countries to increase effort and efficiency.83 In addition to the oil-
producing companies, trading companies were used to purchase oil on the global market. 
Since the early post-World War II years, purchasing oil on the market was the regular 
way to get needed resources. With the growing demand, long-term purchase contracts 
were necessary to provide the needed supplies.84 The oil-producing companies were 
newcomers in an industrial branch, where Western companies had a huge advantage, as 
they were extracting oil on the world market long before Japanese competitors entered 
the stage.85 Privately owned, these new Japanese companies received their capital 
through governmental loans. In addition to these, private funds (further backed by 
governmental loan guarantees) by major financial groups like Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and 
Sumitomo were provided to accumulate capital for the needed oil exploration.86  
To streamline and direct the efforts and to focus the incentives for oil-producing 
companies, a governmental institution was founded under the guidance of MITI, the 
Japan Petroleum Development Corporation.87 These oil-producing companies delivered 
approximately 10 percent of the needed amount of oil back to Japan, and therefore had a 
small share of the overall need in the Japanese economy.88 Parallel to the oil-producing 
companies, which tried to form oil-extracting ventures in varying regions in the world,89 
trading companies were tasked to purchase the needed resources on the world market and 
82 Yuan-li Wu, Japan’s Search for Oil: A Case Study on Economic Nationalism and International 
Security (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977), 63. 
83 Wu, Japan´s Search for Oil, p. 69. 
84 Akao, “Resources and Japan´s Security,” 21.   
85 Ibid., 22. 
86 Wu, Japan´s Search for Oil, 63.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Akao, “Resources and Japan’s Security,” 22. 
89 Wu, Japan’s Search for Oil, 63. 
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in the oil-producing countries directly. These “direct deals”90 were supposed to buy 
needed oil not through international oil-trading companies but directly by Japanese 
trading companies instead.91 As this form of deal increased the Japanese control on 
purchased oil, the risk was in possible higher prices, as countries benefiting from such 
deals could raise the prices for their resources higher than those on the world market.92 
But with the increasing need for oil and gas, those forms of deals became one of the 
supply-pillars of Japan.93  
With the “autonomous development” approach, and therefore the founding of oil-
producing companies, Japan tried to gain direct access to energy resources, to extract 
them in the resource-rich countries directly, and to deliver them back to Japan. Financed 
by governmental loans and private funds, these companies formed ventures in different 
resource-rich countries and were able to provide around 10 percent of the needed 
resources to Japan. The rest of the needed oil was still purchased by trading companies, 
which were relying on long-term contracts, and furthermore were dependent on the price 
of oil which they had to pay on the world market. 
C. FINANCIAL AID/DEVELOPMENT AID 
The second tool Japan used to get access to oil was financial aid. A part of it was 
provided directly to the oil-producing companies, as mentioned in the previous section. 
Another part was provided as a form of development aid or as foreign direct investment. 
All sorts of financial support were assessed as a part of the evolution of the developing 
countries for their own economic and social growth.94 Loans provided by Japan were 
meant to support the resource extraction in the recipient countries; “as part of such 
contracts, Japanese importers often extend loans or make advanced payments to enable 
producers to develop new projects or expand existing ones in return for which Japanese 
import their products. By this means, Japan has been able to secure long-term and stable 
90 Ibid., 60. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 60‒65. 
94 Akao, “Resources and Japan’s Security,” 22. 
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supplies of raw materials.”95 An example of how this foreign aid was used to promote 
Japanese interests and get access to needed resources was the exploration and 
development of the Daqing oilfield in China in 1978. A loan was given to the Chinese to 
buy Japanese equipment and machines to develop this oilfield. Instead of receiving back 
the loaned money, Japan took the produced oil from this oilfield.96 This strategy could be 
called a loan-for-oil strategy, as it is named for Chinese practices later in this thesis.  
As briefly mentioned in the last paragraph, financial support, either for oil-
producing companies or as financial help for recipient countries, was the second tool 
Japan used to get access to oil and gas. As Japan was unable to diversify its supply to 
different countries, most oil and gas was delivered from the Middle Eastern and Arab 
countries.97 Nearly 80 percent of all needed oil and gas were imported from Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait.98 Exceptions were China and later some other countries in 
Southeast Asia (especially Indonesia), but their share remained minimal compared to the 
Middle Eastern states and Saudi Arabia.99 So these countries received the biggest share 
of Japan’s financial efforts to get energy related resources. 
D. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT 
The third and most important tool used was governmental support through 
financial aid and furthermore by accompanying policies and diplomacy. The achievement 
of as much energy security as possible was one of the most important goals for Japan; its 
other goal was to become a leading global economic power.100 Thus, the government 
interest in supporting the energy supply with different means was there and strongly used. 
It became fundamental for Japan to sustain positive relationships with foreign, especially 
raw-material producing countries, to maintain a stable supply of needed resources.101  
95 Akao, “Resources and Japan’s Security,” 21. 
96 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p. 46. 
97 Wu, Japan’s Search for Oil, 73. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Akao, “Introduction,” 5. 
101 Ibid., 9. 
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The first and most important governmental agency to exercise this support was 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. This institution controlled and 
streamlined almost every economic development effort and had a strong influence on 
almost every economic decision.102 To get access to foreign resources MITI and the 
Japanese government supported the outreach with policies by participating financially in 
“international development schemes, especially in oil-producing countries.”103 To 
streamline all energy-related efforts, MITI created in 1967 the Japan Petroleum 
Development Corporation (JPDC) as a sub-organization of MITI. This institution had the 
task to support domestic efforts and to mediate governmental and private issues 
concerning the oil-companies,104 as well as to coordinate loans and credits for them.105 
Although this does not mean that all Japanese companies were coordinated by the JPDC 
before going abroad and investing in foreign countries, at least they all sought MITI’s 
approval before they started their new projects.106 This shows the strong role MITI 
played within economic decisions, and MITI was further able to display its influence in 
energy-related issues as they were eminent in the economic development of Japan.  
Yet it was not only MITI that provided governmental support for the Japanese 
energy sector. The Japanese prime minister as the highest politician provided sometimes 
direct support and exerted influence through foreign policies to support Japan’s energy 
security. One example in this area was the negotiations between Japan’s Prime Minister 
Kishi and Indonesia’s President Sukarno in 1957. The result of these talks opened the 
doors for Japanese companies in Indonesia for the following two decades. This included 
access to raw materials, such as oil and others.107 Although this example of support was 
in the beginning of the Japanese post-World War II economic growth, it shows the 
measures taken by the government officials to support the economic development, 
wherever possible and when needed. This approach shows another kind of deal, driven by 
102 See Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 1925‒
1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
103 Wu, Japan’s Search for Oil, 8. 
104 Ibid., 81. 
105 Ibid., 63. 
106 Ibid., 85. 
107 Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 80. 
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the government, to get access to resources. This “government-to-government”108 deal 
was further shown in the case of Iran. Governmental financial support for development of 
oil-producing companies and refineries, petrochemical complexes, and other facilities 
was provided for a ten-year term, while Japan received 150 million barrels of oil in 
return. This approach shows the strong connection between the so-called loan-for-oil 
strategy and governmental support and direct action. 
One more step taken by the Japanese government was its participation in the 
newly founded IEA, right after the first oil crisis. This organization was to coordinate the 
industrialized nations’ efforts to prevent another oil crisis and its negative impacts on the 
local economies in these countries. The tasks of this IEA are mentioned earlier in this 
chapter and show the more institutionalized approach by the Japanese government.  
What Japan lacked (and still does) was a permanent seat in the Security Council 
of the United Nations organization to exert further influence on energy-related issues. In 
the 1970s with two oil crises occurring, Japan’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil and its 
alliance with the United States showed a challenge for Japanese policies. On the one hand 
it was important to maintain the energy supply; on the other hand, this had to be achieved 
with a more mature and independent foreign policy which diverged from United States’ 
interests and policies.109 
Despite all these challenges, the Japanese government took different actions and 
measures to secure the steady supply of raw materials. A Japanese ministry is responsible 
for economic issues and influences economic development decisions. Concerning energy 
related issues, a sub-organization was formed to support and streamline these actions. 
Where needed, direct political action was taken and provided to maintain the supplies 
with needed resources.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to show briefly the Japanese economic 
development and its governmental goals after its defeat in World War II. To become a 
108 Wu, Japan´s Search for Oil, 62. 
109 Akao, “Resources and Japan’s Security,” 52. 
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global power again, this time with economic instead of military means, was the declared 
goal of the Japanese government. Embedded in the most important international 
organizations, sharing strong ties with the United States, and maintaining a focused 
governmental engagement to achieve this goal, Japan spurred its economic development, 
which led to double-digit growth rates during the 1960s and 1970s. Due to its own 
resource scarcity and specialization in finished, manufactured products, Japan’s need for 
raw materials and energy-rich resources was growing in parallel with the economy. To 
maintain a stable supply of needed resources, the Japanese government supported its 
economy with governmental institutions like MITI (and its sub-organizations), direct 
ministerial support for government-to-government-deals, a variety of financial aid, and 
finally by providing incentives for private companies to start the autonomous 
development of foreign resources. These three tools were used by Japan to get access to 
foreign resources. Oil-producing companies, which received financial support through 
cheap loans and credits and further benefited from foreign direct investments and foreign 
aid, supported the autonomous development of resources. Their share was relatively 
small, just 10 percent of the overall amount. The bigger share was provided by trading 
companies, which either purchased the needed oil on the world market or directly in the 
oil-producing countries (as direct deals). Embedded in different economic-related 
international organizations these approaches show a rather institutionalized approach to 
resources. This would speak for the institutional hypothesis, as Japan was taking benefit 
from its alliance with the U.S. and its integration into different organizations to support 
access to needed resources.  
Financial aid and development support provided by Japan was meant as a door-
opener into resource-rich countries, which was another approach used by Japan. How far 
this approach reached for resources other than oil and gas is not part of this paper, but 
even in the oil-producing countries in the Middle East, this form of support was used to 
get access to resources. 
Finally, governmental support through different means was provided to sustain 
the supply of needed resources. Was it through its own governmental institutions, or by 
direct political intervention, that Japan’s government inevitably had to step in and take 
direct action to gain access to the resources needed to achieve national goals. The 
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declared goals, to become a global power and therefore to overtake the Western 
industrialized nations, showed a realist approach. If Burton’s view, which argues that 
economic power is more important than an effective military power is correct, then the 
Japanese efforts to become an economic world power show this realist approach very 
clearly.  
With the ongoing economic development in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
securing a stable supply of resources was not the only measure taken by Japan to achieve 
energy security. Measures were also taken to increase energy conservation, increase 
energy efficiency, and develop alternative sources for energy. All these efforts were taken 
to increase Japanese energy independence and to reduce its vulnerability. However, these 
measures were unable to supplant needed resources like oil and gas completely; 
therefore, further efforts were still needed as energy independence was a rather difficult 
goal to achieve. The following chapter will look at the People’s Republic of China and its 





China’s rise and leapfrogging development has “given rise to anxiety, misgivings, 
and other insecurity in other capitals—Washington in particular.”110 Furthermore, its 
continued development and outreach to access natural resources happens in a competitive 
market, as all industrialized and industrializing economies need resources. The following 
sections will examine how China reaches out for natural resources, especially oil and gas, 
to support its economic growth. How does the Chinese government support its economic 
growth and its sustainability through corresponding policies towards its neighbors and 
other countries to get access to oil and gas? 
Which of the mentioned hypotheses fits for the People’s Republic China? This 
chapter will argue that it is a high-priority goal for China to achieve energy security as it 
is important for the sustainability of economic growth. This growth is strongly influenced 
by the Chinese government, which uses state-owned enterprises, financial investments 
and aid, and diplomatic support to provide it. Less integrated in international 
organizations than Japan and with other institutional opportunities, the PRC shows a 
realist approach to accessing oil and gas. At the same time, the PRC refrains from 
exercising influence on the resource-providing countries, unlike other countries that push 
for democratization or growing institutionalization according to international institutions’ 
rules and norms. Even so, the government’s survival, if considered equal to the state’s 
survival as the most important goal, is a realist goal according to all realist theorists, 
especially those mentioned in the first part of this thesis. China’s goal of becoming a 
global economic player parallels very closely the goals of industrializing Japan, as 
described in the previous chapter.  
In the first section of this chapter a short overview of the Chinese development 
effort and its growing need for oil and gas is provided. As a second part the role of the 
government and its support in foreign policies will be described. This will give an 
overview of how the government provides ideas and policies to achieve certain goals and 
 
110Da Wei, “Has China Become ‘Tough’?” China Security 6, no. 3, (2010): 39.   
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to access certain places to gain resources. Case studies of Chinese resource-seeking 
activities in Africa and the Middle East will show the Chinese approach and their 
outreach.  
A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Chinese economic growth has been outstanding since the modernization and 
liberalization reform policies of Deng Xiaopeng in 1978 were initiated. With the change 
from a centralized, planned economy via the dual-track system and the change from only 
state-owned enterprises towards both private- and state-owned companies, the Chinese 
government was able to lift more than a third of its population out of poverty. China’s 
GDP per capita has grown from $775 in 1980 to $6500 three decades later.111 China’s 
own natural resource reserves of oil and gas make up only lower single-digit numbers in 
the world, but they were able to cover China’s domestic needs until 1994.112 The ongoing 
economic growth is consequently followed by an increased need for energy providing 
resources. Whereas the daily needs in 2000 were up to 4.8 million barrels, consumption 
in 2009 reached 8.5 million barrels a day.113 Chinese “demand has already outpaced 
supply and is a growing concern for China’s continued economic development.”114 
Dependence on imported oil will further increase and requires a growing attention to 
other regions and a global outreach to get it.115  
To sustain economic growth and therefore provide for China’s further rise as an 
important and powerful global player, and to keep the regime in power, are among the 
central core interests defined by the Chinese government.116 Thus, China’s ruling elites 
111Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj, “The Strategic Implication of China’s Energy 
Engagement with the Developing World,” in China’s Energy Relations with the Developing World, eds. 
Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj (New York: Continuum Books, 2011), 6.  
112Currier and Dorraj, “Strategic Implication,” 6.  
113Ibid., 7.  
114Ibid.  
115John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 3 (2010): 395.  
116M. Taylor Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences,” in 
Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to its Rising Powers China and India, eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Travis 
Tanner, and Jessica Keough (Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011), 68.  
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need to sustain economic growth to stay in power.117 To keep the national economic 
engine going, natural resources, especially oil and gas as energy providers, are required in 
an increasing amount. Even with measures and means to increase efficiency in energy 
consumption, the focus on heavy industry like steel- and aluminum-production plants 
increase the energy need. New and more modern production facilities need less energy 
than the previous generation, but with an overall increase of facilities, more energy is 
needed.118 This leads to an ongoing challenge for the government, as international and 
domestic consequences are to be expected if these resource requirements for growth are 
not met. First, the domestic challenge could be that a decline in wealth and growth leads 
to social unrest. Second, international foreign direct investment (FDI) gambles on 
Chinese economic development aims, which, if not met, could lead to a withdrawal of 
money. Third, the increased needs for oil and gas lead to heightened international 
competition on the world market to purchase these resources, as other countries have a 
lack of their own resource reserves and strong incentives to buy energy resources. 
B. NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES/NOCS 
The Chinese government uses different means to get access to foreign oil 
reserves, including the National Oil Companies (NOCs), use of financial and foreign aid, 
and governmental support through diplomacy and policies which support access to 
resources in foreign countries.  
At the national level there are several actions taken to control the energy sector 
and to streamline its efforts to increase efficiency and to achieve as much energy security 
as possible—e.g., the implementation of a National Energy Commission, the National 
Development and Reform Commission, and the founding of the NOCs represent these 
efforts.119 While the national energy sector at the governmental level seems to be 
117Suisheng Zhao, “Between Rhetoric and Pragmatism,” in Challenges to Chinese Foreign Policies: 
Diplomacy, Globalization, and the Next World Power, ed. Yufan Hao, C.X. George Wei, and Lowell 
Dittmer (Lexington: Kentucky University Press, 2009), 241.  
118C. Fred Bergstein, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy, and Derek J. Mitchell, China’s Rise: 
Challenges and Opportunities (Washington: United Book Press, 2008), 141.  
119Øystein Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risks (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2013), 40.  
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underrepresented and still suffers a lack of personnel, the NOCs operate with a strong 
governmental mandate to supply China with its needed resources.120 
With the beginning reform of China in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s, the 
most important NOCs were transformed from governmental agencies into state-owned 
enterprises: China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), Sinopec, and China’s National 
Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC).121 The administration and management structures of 
these companies were carried over from the former ministries. Furthermore the leading 
managers of these companies were, and continue to be, high ranking party members with 
an alternate seat in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.122 Hence 
these companies have political influence, knowledge and expertise, and needed resources 
at their disposal to play an important role in contributing to China’s energy needs.123 The 
CCP has a strong direct influence over these companies and makes decisions about 
leading personnel by appointing or dismissing managers and directors. Policy 
implementation is done by different smaller party institutions, which secure the 
compliance and the implementation of party goals within these companies.124  
Thus, it can be clearly seen that the government and the three biggest Chinese oil 
drilling and extracting companies have strong reciprocal connections and 
interdependences. While providing diplomatic aid on the political stage, and providing 
cheap credits and subsidies from governmental side, it was possible for these companies 
to search for oil in foreign countries.125 Although these companies are influenced by the 
CCP, they still are allowed to sell a huge share of the oil on the world energy market. 
This increases the financial gains of these companies, which have to pay a part of it to the 
PRC government,126 but they still have control of the majority of their gains.  
120Erica Downs, “China’s Energy Rise,” in China´s Rise in Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly 
Womack (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 182.   
121Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 39.  
122 Ibid.  
123Downs, “China’s Energy Rise,” 182.  
124Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 41.  
125Ibid., 76.  
126Ibid., 41.  
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These companies get further support from other governmental institutions by 
providing credits, subsidies, and diplomatic aid to get into foreign countries. Even if the 
companies sell the majority of their produced oil on the world energy market as other 
companies do as well, the government can, in case of energy supply emergencies, order 
these companies to provide their oil to the Chinese economy first. So the first answer to 
how China gets access to natural resources like oil and gas is via its own NOCs, which 
are driven by governmental support and guidance into foreign countries to search and 
drill for oil, and therefore, to support and feed partially the Chinese hunger for energy. 
Although these companies are the tool to get access to oil, they are on their own not very 
useful. To be successful in searching for oil, one needs territorial access to where oil 
might be and must have money to invest, to build, to drill, and to extract. These other 
important dimensions of resource access are provided by diplomacy, conducted by the 
Chinese government and by financial aid, which is provided through different channels, 
but by the same institution, the government of the PRC. 
C. FINANCIAL AID/DEVELOPMENT AID 
This section examines the ways in which financial aid (and, therefore, sometimes 
foreign aid) is used by the Chinese government to gain access to foreign countries and 
their natural resources. It is important to mention here that the foreign aid is not only 
provided in exchange for natural resources alone. There are many goals China tries to 
achieve while providing financial aid. It may be for Chinese products in exchange for 
other raw materials or the opening for new markets; foreign aid is used in many different 
ways to support the Chinese economy and to present China as a politically attractive 
partner on the world’s stage.127 Deborah Brautigam even argues in her book that there 
are no such quid pro quo oil-for-money deals made by China,128 but other authors show 
that there is still a strong reciprocity in these exchanges.  
Around the world, in the most important oil-producing countries, either the 
Chinese government, Chinese banks (state-owned banks like China’s Development Bank 
127Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 86.   
128Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 12.  
 37 
                                                 
(CDB) or Chinese Export Import Bank (Eximbank)), or the NOCs have signed “loan-for-
petroleum deals.”129 Providing the money for China’s long-term supply falls within the 
responsibility of the CDB.130 Although absolute numbers are not openly published by 
Chinese officials, China’s overseas investments concerning petroleum were higher than 
$60 billion in 2009 and 2010. This money was provided to the NOCs, which gave them a 
stake in 200 investment projects.131 The current overseas oil deals China’s NOCs have 
made could provide 7.8 billion barrels in the next few years. Countries like Canada, 
Brazil, Argentina, Angola, Sudan, and others have sold their oil or their oilfields to the 
NOCs.132 Still there is no certainty when these investments will pay off for these 
companies, since the extraction of oil in the included countries has not always started.133 
Another method for gaining access, as mentioned earlier, is the use of foreign aid. 
Foreign aid is not specifically a special tool to get access to oil, although there are 
examples where foreign aid is directly connected to oil. Examples here are Angola, or the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, where huge credits for infrastructural improvement were 
contracted. The pay back for these contracts was settled with oil.134 
There are only a few numbers available concerning the practice of China’s 
government and banks providing money to get access to foreign oil and gas reserves and 
the extent to which its NOCs get further direct financial support. Yet it is obvious that 
many efforts are taken by Chinese institutions to secure the supply for the PRC. State-
owned banks provide cheap loans for the NOCs and provide foreign aid and help to oil-
rich countries to get access to their natural resources. Especially overseas investments 
seem to be the means to feed China’s resource hunger. From this perspective, the opening 
of the Chinese economy and China’s entry into the global market allowed China to use 
market mechanisms of buying and selling to gain oil and gas.  
129Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 80.  
130Ibid.  
131Ibid.  
132“China Seals Oil Deals: Map of China’s Major Overseas Oil Deals,” Center of American Progress, 
accessed March 19, 2014, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/ news/2010/04/27/7650/china-
seals-oil-deals/.   
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D. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT 
Chinese government support and policies towards other countries is the last tool 
for securing access to natural resources like oil and gas. Since China’s resource hunger 
leads to growing competition and frictions in the global energy market, this change has 
impacts on international politics.135 With the former two instruments, NOCs and 
financial support, crude oil and gas can be extracted and brought on the energy world 
market and to the PRC. One might think that the policies of money and contracts are 
sufficient to get the needed access. But on the political stage there are further means. 
With the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese state on the mainland 
remained unaccepted and unrecognized by the majority of world’s governments. China’s 
foreign policies must still be seen in connection with the early declarations formulated in 
the 1950s and 1960s. The five principles of peaceful coexistence, the communique after 
the Bandung Conference, and, most important, the “Eight Principles for Foreign Aid,”136 
together with the fact that China never colonized other countries, contributes to the strong 
credibility of the benevolence of China’s foreign policies. Through negotiations with 
India the five principles of coexistence were formulated, which included “mutual respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each 
other’s internal affairs, equality, and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.”137 After 
the proclamation of these five principles, at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the 
participation of 29 African, Middle East, and Asian countries, another declaration on 
foreign policy was made. Colonization, exploitation, and subjugation are the abuse of 
human rights, and therefore hamper the development of a peaceful world.138 The third 
step, which is based on the former declarations, was Zhou Enlai’s declaration of “China’s 
Eight Principles of Providing Foreign Aid.”139  
135Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 198. 
136Michael B. Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), 159, 160.  
137Han Nianlong, Diplomacy of Contemporary China (Hong Kong: New Horizon Press, 1990), 101.  
138Nianlong, Diplomacy of Contemporary China, 105.  
139Yahuda, China’s Role, 159, 160. 
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Most important for this thesis, these principles include China’s declaration to 
provide foreign aid based on reciprocal benefit and equality; non-interference in domestic 
affairs and non-violation of sovereignty; allocation of interest-free or low-interest loans 
with extension of pay back schedules, if needed; preservation of recipient countries’ 
independence; provision of short-term projects with high impact; supply of high-quality 
appurtenances, training, and education of recipient countries’ technicians; and assurance 
that Chinese workers and engineers will share the living conditions of the recipient 
countries’ workers.140 The PRC still sticks to its declaration of the five principles, the 
declaration or communique made after the Bandung Conference, and the principles for 
providing foreign aid, which support their entry into varying resource-rich countries. 
Also the Chinese government currently takes a benefit out of the fact that China never 
colonized other countries. This increases the Chinese credibility in the eyes of many, 
especially African, leaders.141 While the Western world perceives the Chinese approach 
as neo-colonization and points at it on a regular basis,142 Dambisa Moyo’s definition of 
colonization, where foreign states do not respect the colony’s sovereignty but implement 
their own rules, laws, and sovereignty, China clearly does not follow this path.143 She 
takes it even further, when stating that China has only economic interests and does not 
pay any attention to the domestic issues of the respective countries.144  
The former colonization by Western countries challenges and fosters China’s 
access for oil, while influencing its foreign policies in different ways.145 While the oil-
producing countries in Southeast Asia, for example, already had contracts with their 
former colonizers’ petroleum companies, there was no access for Chinese companies. 
The same situation existed in Africa and the Middle East. The exception in this case 
where growing diplomatic relationships with Saudi Arabia—supported by United States 
140Ibid.  
141Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 10.  
142Dambisa F. Moyo, Winner Take All: China’s Race for Resources and What it Means for the World  
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Developing World, eds. Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj (New York: Continuum Books, 2011), 
107.    
 40 
                                                 
diplomacy to give the PRC a substitution for Iranian oil—allowed Chinese NOCs to get 
access to the oil fields.146 On the other hand, history gave China the opportunities to gain 
access to countries which shared a colonization history and (which is important in this 
case) where the Western investors did not express interest, due to political unrest, civil 
wars, or the aftermath of such exogenous shocks, or simply due to dissatisfaction with the 
countries’ governments and behavior (e.g., Iran or Sudan).147 In these countries the 
Chinese approach of not intervening in domestic affairs, as long as Chinese workers are 
not affected, still proves the commitment to the early communique of the Bandung 
Conference and the five principles of peaceful coexistence. This commitment and the 
resulting perception of the PRC allow it to gain access to some of the last less developed 
oil countries and areas. China’s noninterference in domestic affairs, intertwined with a 
strong disinterest for international affairs concerning human rights violations in certain 
countries, makes China attractive for oil (and gas) producing countries to invite China to 
invest, send the NOCs, and extract the resources. 
The previous three sections evaluated and examined the Chinese means to get 
access to foreign countries and their respective oil reserves. The three tools cannot be 
separated analytically; they are intertwined in practice. The CCP has overall control of 
the policies, which also means foreign policy. Furthermore, the CCP has a strong 
influence on the NOCs and controls their personnel issues, which makes these companies 
a step within the party’s career system and nomenklatura. With different political sub-
institutions within these companies, the national interests and goals are maintained, and 
even if the companies are allowed to make money on the world energy market, they are 
held in the tracks of the CCP and its political and economic goals. Banks play the second 
largest role in this framework, especially the Chinese Development Bank and the 
Eximbank. Those two are state-owned credit institutions, which provide the needed loans 
and investment money for the NOCs. Even if the exact amount of money, and the exact 
procedures and conditions for the NOCs to get this financial support are kept opaque, 
without the necessary monetary support a global expansion of these companies would be 
impossible. But only together with the third tool, foreign policies according to the early 
146Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 104.  
147Hong, “China´s Energy Relations,” 107. 
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statements drafted two decades before the Chinese economic reforms were started, can 
the former two tools unfold their power. If the Chinese companies and their money, and 
the Chinese government with its will to help development, are perceived as a new wave 
of colonization—or as exploitation—there would be a much smaller part of the world 
willing to sell their resources or land to China’s oil companies. 
E. CASE STUDIES 
The following section will provide some case studies, where the interlinked 
adoption of all three means can be explained. There are nuances and differences in 
different countries concerning how China sustains its own supplies in natural resources, 
especially oil and gas, but in all examples all three tools will play a stronger or weaker 
role to achieve this goal. Two African examples of Sudan and Angola will provide the 
examples of when foreign investment, diplomacy, and the NOCs go into foreign 
countries, despite criticism from the rest of the world, as human rights violations and 
authoritarian regimes seem to be supported by the PRC. Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 
third example show the opportunities China gets if Western companies are hampered in 
getting access due to international sanctions against current regimes. This example also 
illustrates how China uses geopolitics to foster its own interests. This access to oil and 
gas resources differs from the African examples; thus, it shows the variety of approaches 
and methods China employs to achieve its energy security by providing a diversification 
of trading partner countries.  
1. China and Sudan 
The relationship between the PRC and Sudan (which includes both the northern 
and the southern parts) was founded already in the late 1970s and early 1980s. When oil 
was discovered in Sudan, Western companies did not go into the country due to the 
conflict between the government and the southern rebels fighting for their 
independence.148 Chinese companies, in the case of Sudan CNPC, went in and filled the 
empty space.149 While Sudan was, despite its rich resources, still an oil importer in the 
148Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 92.  
149Ibid.  
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1990s, it changed its position with Chinese investments.150 Sudanese oil is important for 
China, as it has become the sixth important oil provider for the PRC, with more than 60 
percent of its exported oil going to China.151 The overall investment in Sudan’s oil sector 
until 1999 was estimated at $8 billion, used for building pipelines connecting CNPC’s 
wells with processing plants and an oil terminal in Port Sudan.152 The amount of further 
subsidies and loans CNPC received from Chinese banks to sustain its investments are 
unknown. But a deal between the Sudanese and the Chinese governments was made 
establishing that foreign direct investment given to Sudan must be spent for Chinese oil 
companies, while the supervision of progress, as well as the tax and trade revenues, were 
supposed to return to the Sudanese banks.153  
However, it would be misleading to portray the relationship between the PRC and 
Sudan as limited to oil (and related infrastructure) investments. China is known to 
provide Sudan with small arms, planes, and infrastructure projects, which further foster 
the relationship between the government in Khartoum and the PRC.154 While Øystein 
Tunsjø connects these different kinds of aid and support with the oil business,155 Deborah 
Brautigam insists that there is no clear strategic plan and effort in the structure of Chinese 
investments in Sudan (and over the whole of Africa), which proves a resource exploiting 
strategy by the PRC.156 The trading deals with various African countries include African 
manufactured goods and other resources, which help to increase living standards for 
many Africans, therefore really giving aid.157 But Brautigam confirms that Chinese 
money invested in Sudan goes back to China, as the Sudanese government buys weapons 
to fight the rebels.158 To secure its stakes in Sudan and obtain the good relationship with 
150Ibid.  
151Hong, “China’s Energy Relations,” 107. 
152Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 92.  
153Hong, “China’s Energy Relations,” 109.  
154Ibid., 93; Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 281.  
155Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 92.  
156Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 279.  
157Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres and Sophal Ear, The Hungry Dragon: How China’s Resource Quest is 
Reshaping the World (New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 74, 75.  
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the government in Khartoum, China has used its power and position in the United 
Nations to hamper a deployment of UN peacekeepers. With growing international 
pressure before the Olympic summer games in 2008 in Beijing, however, the PRC 
government and the UN engaged in mediation, which finally allowed the dispatch of UN 
peacekeeping forces. The implemented sanctions on Sudan that followed were 
nevertheless reduced in strength by China, so finally the PRC could maintain its 
relationship with Sudan and still play an important role in geopolitics without risking its 
energy supply.159 
The example of Sudan shows the use of all three tools to get Sudanese oil for the 
Chinese economy. The NOCs serve as the first tool. In the Sudanese case it is CNPC 
which is responsible for finding oil and extracting it. While expanding on the Sudanese 
oil market, CNPC is assumed to have received financial support from Chinese banks and 
definitely received the money from Chinese foreign direct investment given to the 
government in Khartoum. This example shows the strong reciprocity between financial 
support, foreign aid, and the state owned enterprises, which benefit from this situation. 
But as the Sudan case further shows, even the Sudanese government benefits out of this 
deal, as revenues and taxes go back into its state’s treasuries, which underlines the 
impression and perception that colonial exploitation does not take place in the Sudan. In 
addition to financial aid and market mechanisms of buying and selling, the PRC 
government provides strong diplomatic support in different ways to sustain the economic 
relationship. Even though the Sudanese government purchases Chinese weapons for its 
civil war in the south, it is nevertheless still getting further foreign aid for improvements 
of the overall infrastructure. And finally on a geopolitical level, where UN sanctions are 
strongly influenced by the Chinese government, the diplomatic behavior (and as much 
non-interference in domestic affairs as possible) provides a strong support for CNPC to 
further extract the needed resources and bring them back to the PRC and/or to sell it on 
the world energy market.  
159Ibid., 182.  
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2. China and Angola 
The second example, Angola, illustrates the loan-for-oil deals provided by the 
PRC. A long war of independence, which later turned into a civil war, destroyed almost 
the entire country.160 With the end of the civil war at the beginning of this century, 
Angola had enormous debts and was struggling to repay them. An offer by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was conditioned by participation in different IMF 
programs to solve the financial problem. These programs included institutionalization, 
fighting against corruption, transparency in economics, and other issues.161 Since 
Angola’s oil capacity is estimated up to 2 million barrels per day, and there was still the 
chance for Chinese NOCs to expand in the region, China offered a credit of $2 billion 
unconditionally and with a much longer retention period than usual. The only condition 
which is mentioned as such was that this money had to be used to rebuild the country’s 
infrastructure.162 With the Chinese offer Angola’s negotiations with the IMF stopped and 
China provided the needed credit.163 To cover this credit, Angola backed this loan with 
oil,164 and hence delivers oil to China.  
This short example of Angola shows the loan-for-oil approach from the PRC’s 
side towards an African country. China shows clearly its intentions and follows them 
despite other institutions, which seem to have different incentives. While the IMF was 
concerned with the governmental policies and corruption in Angola and therefore wanted 
the government to conduct reforms and intertwined these reforms as preconditions for 
further credits, China showed no interest in domestic affairs and just offered a loan with 
nearly no conditions and with a much longer time to repay it.165 
160Caceres and Ear, The Hungry Dragon, 63.  
161Bautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 274.  
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3. China and Middle East, Saudi Arabia 
The third case to show the Chinese approach focuses on the Middle East, with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran, where the PRC has to consider more political issues and 
challenges than in its other sources. Here the changing political environment, paired with 
a need to obtain an open-door-policy to all sides, forces and challenges Chinese foreign 
policy.  
Besides market mechanisms, which influence the price for crude oil and gas, the 
up and down in Iranian oil and gas imports to China is strongly affected by geopolitical 
and regional decisions. Since Iran is subject to various UN sanctions due to its nuclear 
program, China has supported all attempts in the UN Security Council to provide these 
sanctions.166 However, the PRC’s government has agreed to those sanctions under the 
condition that energy-related issues where excluded.167 So China’s NOCs (Sinopec and 
CNPC in Iran) could make further investments. Despite these agreements, oil imports 
from Iran declined in late 2009 and early 2010, grew during 2010 until 2011, and then 
decreased again.168 Tunsjø traces these changes back to market mechanisms and political 
decisions.  
As the UN sanctions (strongly requested by the U.S.) against Iran took hold, 
China was struggling between its good relations with the U.S. and the PRC’s resource 
needs from Iran. With the ongoing sanctions, Iran needed to sell its oil and gas to get 
money into its economy. Hence, Iran had to sell its oil below market prices, which made 
the oil even more attractive to China.169 But due to political pressure from the U.S. and 
the Saudis, there were some restrictions to reduce the amount of Iranian oil. Nevertheless, 
the Saudis filled the gap left after the decline in Iranian oil imports, and seemed to be 
more than willing to sell their oil to China. First, because the Saudis were afraid of an 
Iranian nuclear program, as was the U.S., and second, the Saudis could decrease their 
dependence on oil exports to the U.S. as they got access to a new, and in the future even 
166Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 103.  
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bigger, energy market than the U.S.170 But even with growing investments, and stronger 
economic and political cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the PRC, the latter is still 
receiving oil and gas from Iran and further tries to keep a good relationship with it to 
sustain the NOCs’ access to the needed resources.171  
The case of these two countries shows how the PRC uses its political weight in 
geopolitics to shape events and institutional decisions according to its own needs. It 
further shows that the PRC is not immune to political pressure from other powers, but 
proved itself to be flexible to changing situations and able to adapt its policies to sustain 
its basic needs, in this case for natural resources like oil and gas. This flexibility gives the 
PRC the opportunity to keep open doors in all directions and to benefit from all 
possibilities without damaging its reputation and jeopardizing its own supply. 
F. CONCLUSION 
To sustain further economic growth and therefore maintain the CCP’s power in 
China, the satisfaction of domestic energy needs is inevitable. This chapter has examined 
the PRC’s ways to get access to resources like oil and gas, as they are the most effective 
energy providers. Three major tools, which the PRC uses to get access to and to influence 
resource-rich countries, were identified.  
First, there are the national oil companies, which play the most important role in 
exploring and extracting the resources, while consuming (unknown) amounts of financial 
support from the Chinese government. These NOCs go into foreign resource-rich 
countries to get the oil and the gas out and then ship it back to China or sell it directly on 
the energy world market, which is important to stay competitive as the revenues 
accumulate for more capital.  
The second important tool is financial aid. It can be provided, as mentioned 
previously, directly to the state-owned oil companies or can be offered to the resource-
rich countries, which then invest it in Chinese companies for improvements, for example, 




                                                 
in their infrastructure. This financial aid could be provided as foreign direct investment, 
foreign (development) aid, or as loan-for-oil deals. In most cases these loans carry 
attractive conditions concerning the payback-modalities and no conditions concerning the 
recipient’s domestic or political affairs, such as demands for less corruption or more 
institutionalization. These better conditions are still rooted in the eight principles of 
foreign aid announced by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s during his numerous African 
journeys. With growing Chinese economic power, influence, and self-confidence, this 
form of support can be sustained in the future.  
Just as declarations of various principles affect the allocation of financial support, 
Chinese foreign policies are strongly influenced by them as well. The non-interference in 
domestic affairs, non-violation of states’ sovereignty, and the mutual benefits of 
relationships give the Chinese approach credibility. Using these principles seems less 
exploitative and therefore not like colonization, and hence increases the different 
countries’ willingness to allow Chinese companies to seek and extract oil and gas. All 
three means go together, with a different emphasis applied in different countries. But 
after all, China makes perpetual use of these tools and uses them to get access to 
countries, which can provide the PRC with the needed resources.  
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V. COMPARISON 
After the general and separate descriptions of the two countries in the previous 
chapters, it is time to compare both countries, with respect to their methods for obtaining 
resources like oil and gas, and with respect to the hypotheses described at the outset of 
this thesis. With respect to the power-transition theory and the underlying realism theory, 
there are certain ways of behavior to expect from both countries. Besides the theoretical 
assumption of an anarchic world that has no superior guardian providing law and order 
amongst states, both countries must look out first and foremost for their own survival. 
Having achieved this goal, the development of power and accumulation of it would be 
the next step to become a regional hegemon. If there is already one leading power in the 
region, the development of a challenger will proceed until the challenger has accumulated 
enough power to challenge the hegemon. By contrast, the current hegemon is aware of 
potential challengers and contains them before they become too dangerous. If we divide 
power, as Mearsheimer and other theorists have done, into the two different kinds 
mentioned in the Chapter II, development of effective—military—power is most 
important. To achieve this power accumulation, economic power as a latent power seems 
to be inevitable to achieve a sustainable form of effective power. So both countries must 
have some form of economic development. If the theoretical development of the thought 
that economic power is even more important in the modern world than military power, 
there is no further need for countries to transform latent power into military power.  
But how does that fit to Japan in the 1970s and current China? Both countries 
have connected and still connect their national interests with economic growth. While 
Japan decided to become an economic global power, the PRC needs further economic 
development and growth to maintain the Communist’s party rule over China.172 So, 
economic growth is important for both countries, as it ensures state survival and further 
development into a leading position. This approach fits completely into realist theory. 
Both countries seek their own survival first, followed by a sort of power development to 
become a leader—a hegemon—in some way. Both countries have strong interests in their 
172 Langdon, Japan’s Foreign Policy, 2; Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise,” 68. 
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own economic development and therefore a strong governmental interest to take 
influence. As this was the case for Japan and still is for China, the supplies of energy-rich 
resources like oil and gas needed to feed their growing economies was the focus of their 
respective governmental institutions, as shortfalls in energy supplies would affect their 
economies on the grand scale. This is very similar for both countries, especially since 
both face resource scarcity in the cases of oil and gas. Even if China was an oil exporter 
until 1994, since then its need for these resources has exceeded the country’s own 
production, which therefore might be considered resource scarcity. 
A. OIL-PRODUCING COMPANIES/NOCS 
To ensure the supply of these needed resources, Japan as well as China formed 
oil-producing companies, which were tasked to develop oil and gas fields in foreign 
countries and extract the needed resources. While the Japanese government tended to 
provide incentives for the establishment of private oil-producing companies,173 the 
Chinese government transformed former responsible governmental institutions into 
national oil companies.174 The Japanese oil-producing companies were in part funded by 
private capital providers, which got their credit backed by governmental money. When 
they appeared in the world oil market, these companies were already latecomers in 
comparison to the Western economies, and therefore had to get experience first. But even 
with this autonomous development approach, Japan received around 10 percent of its 
needed oil through its own oil-producing companies.175 The rest of the needed oil is 
purchased by trading companies, which then sell it on the Japanese market.176 As these 
companies multiplied during the 1970s, it is obvious that they faced fierce competition 
even amongst themselves, which led to a declining number of these companies and 
government-supported projects in that time period.177   
173 Wu, Japan’s Search for Oil, 63. 
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The Chinese companies work differently from the Japanese. They are funded by 
governmental financial support and the Chinese government even prevents competition 
among those companies on the national level. While bidding for foreign resource fields 
and locations, governmental guidance dictates which company goes to which place. This 
does not mean that these companies do not compete with each other, but their efforts are 
still governmentally streamlined to increase their output.178 While the Japanese 
companies delivered their extracted resources back to Japan (see earlier discussion), the 
Chinese companies are allowed to sell the majority of their oil on the world market. This 
increases their own capital and gives them additional competitive power in comparison to 
the other global oil companies. Today the Chinese companies have the same 
disadvantage the Japanese companies had three decades earlier; they are newcomers in an 
already developed and capital-intensive industrial branch. As Tunsjø puts it, the Chinese 
companies do not have a protectionist approach,179 which could be assessed as a realist 
hegemon approach. They still do participate in the energy world market by providing 
sellable resources. However, in case of urgency, the Chinese government can redirect the 
oil and gas from their own companies to China, which would take these resources 
directly from the world market into the Chinese economy.180  
Japan in the 1970s and present-day China have used the same tool, oil-producing 
companies, to extract the needed resources of oil and gas directly. As did Japanese 
companies earlier, the Chinese companies get strong financial support and backing from 
the government to achieve their important goals. But while the Japanese companies had 
to exist in strong competition not only within the world energy market but amongst each 
other, the Chinese firms are more focused and streamlined. Their competition on the 
world market ensures their economic survival in the industrial environment, while the 
state prevents a destructive competition between them if they are potentially trying to get 
access to the same sources. These slight differences show the variations countries might 
choose to feed their energy needs. Nevertheless, especially in the case of China, there is 
no protectionist approach visible currently, but as the companies are state-owned and run 
178 Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 42. 
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by, or better through, the party, this approach can be chosen easily. At least there is a 
chance for China, to redirect its share of the world energy market directly into its own 
economy, if such measures are needed.  
B. FINANCIAL AID/DEVELOPMENT AID 
The second tool both countries have used is financial support. In this case, there is 
even a learning process to recognize. Japan used financial support for its companies, 
guided and directed by MITI and its sub-organization JPDC. Money was provided as 
capital for the oil-producing companies, as these companies were latecomers in a capital-
intensive industrial branch. The same accounts for current China. The state-owned 
enterprises get loans and credits from the government to expand their activities in the 
world market. In addition to that, the Chinese companies sell a share of their production 
on the world market to accumulate their own capital further and repay some of their 
funds to the government as well.181  
Another dimension of financial aid is provided to the recipients—energy-rich 
countries. Financial and developmental aid was provided by the Japanese government to 
China to develop the Daqing oilfield at the end of the 1970s, when the relations between 
Japan and China eased up (according to the parallel ongoing rapprochement in the Sino-
U.S.  relations). Japan provided development aid to China to explore the oil field and to 
build the needed infrastructure and industrial complexes to extract the oil. With the 
money came conditions on its uses. Finally, it was reinvested in Japanese oil companies, 
Japanese equipment, and Japanese knowledge. This way of connecting conditions with 
financial development aid ensured the further growth of the Japanese economy, as they 
were exporting goods and products, in this case machines and more. In addition to these 
benefits, the development aid was provided in the form of a loan, which had to be paid 
back by the Chinese. This repayment was done in oil, thus it was a loan-for-oil deal.  
This system was later copied by the Chinese government and companies when 
they moved out to extract oil and gas as needed resources. This special kind of loan-for-
oil deal is rather uncommon for Chinese approaches. They act more according to their 
181 Tunsjø, Security and Profit, 41. 
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different proclaimed principles of the early 1950s and 1960s concerning international 
relations, especially with the developing world; however, in countries like Angola they 
still chose this approach. Other countries that receive Chinese financial aid, like Sudan, 
allow Chinese companies to build the needed infrastructure to transport oil and gas, and 
to ship it. Sudan also allows the Chinese companies to extract the oil and uses the money 
it gets from China to buy other Chinese items, such as commodities and weapons.182 So 
the Japanese approach is still visible, as the Chinese copied it years later when they had 
to start moving into foreign countries to get access to resources.  
This way of providing financial aid but connecting conditions to it, to ensure a 
backflow of at least a part of this development aid into its own economy again, can be 
seen as some sort of a realist approach. There is financial help for a developing country 
provided, but instead of just providing help, the money gets guided back into the sender 
states’ pockets. This might lead on the one hand to a positive perception of the help-
providing countries; on the other hand, it is a form of helping their own economy by 
providing markets for their own products, and furthermore for preventing other countries’ 
products from getting purchased. This kind of economic behavior can be assessed as a 
realist approach, as it aims at protecting the own economy and preventing others from 
having a share of a certain market.  
Japan in the 1970s and China today have both used and continue to use financial 
aid as the second tool to get access to needed resources. Either as direct loan-for-oil 
deals, which were the preferred method for Japan, or as developmental aid with a share 
for the government and the redirection of the money via other economic channels, as 
preferred by China. Both countries use the money to get the needed resources. But both 
have a similar strategy behind the use of financial aid, which is provided to developing 
countries. The spent money is supposed to be used for products and commodities 
produced in the donating countries. This form of economic protection of markets can be 
assessed in both cases as a realist approach, as it strengthens the own economies and 
secures foreign markets for the own products. In addition, there is a constructivist twist 
182 Hong, “China’s Energy Relations,” 93; Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, 281. 
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explaining China’s behavior, in that it shows an element of learning from Japan’s 
outreach in China in the 1970s.  
C. GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT 
The third means both countries have used and still use is strong governmental 
support to get access to needed resources. The following discussion will show the 
differences and similarities in the two countries’ behavior to support access to resources 
and achieve the highest possible amount of energy security. Not only do the differing 
political systems affect the type of government support, they also affect the comparative 
participation in international organizations and relations with other nations, as allies once 
influenced Japan’s approach and today also influence China’s approach. 
First of all it needs to be stated that all previously mentioned tools are useless and 
would not gain access to oil and gas if there were no government support. Backing of 
credits and loans, providing diplomatic support by opening doors into foreign countries’ 
economies through negotiations, or participating in international organizations, which can 
provide international support and some sort of protection through laws and norms to a 
certain extent, can be provided by governmental support. As the supply with energy-rich 
resources is most important for both countries to sustain their economic growth in the 
phase in which they are compared in this paper, there was a strong governmental interest 
in providing as much support as possible.  
Overall the Japanese government’s support showed an institutional approach to 
getting access to oil and gas. Entering a newly formed international organization to 
coordinate the energy supplies with other energy-consuming nations showed a path, 
which was likely to follow the institutional theory. With the other two means to get 
access to oil and gas, the question remains whether the participation of institutions really 
follows the liberalism theory, or whether the institutions where just another tool to 
achieve the goal of accumulating economic power to become a global economic power. 
In this case, the participation in the IEA was meant to support the Japanese efforts to 
sustain the supplies of oil and gas to keep their economy growing.  
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The Chinese government’s support to get access to oil and gas started earlier as 
economic growth. As the newly founded People’s Republic of China sought international 
recognition it formulated different principles to express China’s approach to other 
developing countries. Still acting according to these principles supports the Chinese 
approach. The Chinese do not interfere in domestic affairs within the countries they 
extract the resources from. This Chinese behavior can be assessed as conforming to the 
realism theory, as the ideas and values of international organizations, which are normally 
formulating sanctions in those countries, are undermined by China’s efforts and its 
behavior. This is exemplified in the case of Angola, where efforts from the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank were completely annulled by the Chinese loan-for-
oil deal, or in the case of the Iran, where China used its permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council to exert influence according to its needs. 
Therefore a clear realist approach from the Chinese side is to be seen, which 
further might raise the question regarding to what extent the Chinese are willing to act 
according to the power-transition theory. With the ongoing economic interdependence 
and participation in the World Trade Organization, a classical power-transition according 
to the theory explained in the first chapter is hardly to expect in the near future. How this 
might change in future, when China is able to accumulate more economic power and 
increase its influence in international politics, is unpredictable. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The comparison of Japan and China shows that Japan thirty years ago got access 
to oil in a strategic, concerted manner that today the Chinese are also employing and, to 
some extent, emulating. The means both countries have used and still use seem similar, 
as they both use oil-producing companies, financial support and aid, and strong 
governmental influence to get access to resources. But within these similar methods there 
are still differences in the ways these tools are used. While Japan emphasizes private 
efforts, backed and guided by governmental support, the Chinese government is directly 
involved. The NOCs are state-owned enterprises with strong connections into the party’s 
nomenklatura. Financial and development aid was provided by Japan on the condition 
that the money be used to buy other Japanese products and goods, which redirected the 
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money into the Japanese economy. Today’s China does the same, but as the development 
aid is provided according to the eight principles of foreign aid which puts constraints on 
the Chinese efforts to provide the best equipment, this approach is finally not perceived 
as exploitative and negative. This goes directly together with the support provided by the 
Chinese government. These principles were declared by the Chinese government and are 
still a guideline for the companies and the government. Japanese firms did not have such 
constraints for their outreach into foreign countries; nevertheless, their efforts were also 
backed by the government. The MITI and its sub-organization, JPDC, gave guidance to 
energy-related industries. Furthermore their financial support was streamlined by these 
institutions.  
While Japan joined several international organizations to support its economic 
growth, China was excluded from the majority of these. Especially Japanese participation 
in the IEA after the first oil crisis shows a more liberal-institutional approach by Japan, 
while their other ways of getting access to resources seems rather realist. The use of oil-
producing companies, which are tasked to extract the oil in the foreign countries and send 
it back to Japan, shows a more protectionist way of getting oil for the Japanese economy. 
The way financial support is used and redirected into the Japanese economy by placing 
conditions on the use of the aid is another protectionist approach. This ensures the 
Japanese economy access to markets and finally keeps the foreign and development aid 
in its own economy. So it is difficult to assess the institutionalism in the Japanese 
government’s efforts. As the use of the other two means looks rather like realist theory, 
this institutionalization within the Japanese interests could just be another step to achieve 
the realist goal, to become a global economic power. 
For China a realist approach is clearly visible. First, China is not participating in 
as many international organizations as Japan is. China is not a member of the IEA, which 
means China does not have to act according to IEA regulations on how to provide energy 
security, and China is not coordinating its efforts with other energy-consuming countries. 
Furthermore China uses its position, power, and influence in the United Nations to 
influence possible economic sanctions against countries that are important Chinese 
energy suppliers, as was shown in the case of Iran. If the shortfalls in resources can be 
supplemented by other countries, then China is willing to cooperate and act according to 
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the other members of the UN Security Council. If there is no possible alternative source 
of energy resources, Chinese influence will be exerted to reduce the effect of UN 
sanctions on energy suppliers so that Chinese interests are not jeopardized. 
What can be taken as a constructivist approach is the Chinese way of copying the 
Japanese three decades earlier. This copying could be seen as the influence from the 
Japanese approach which proved successful and thus seems to be taken by the Chinese. 
But still there are slight differences, which give their approach some Chinese 
characteristics.  
So, finally, there could have been a partly institutional approach by the Japanese 
government, and a constructivist by the Chinese. But as stated already, these approaches 
seem rather likely to be chosen to support the overall realist aim of becoming a global 
economic power. For China there is a clear realism approach visible. All its actions are 
aiming at system survival and economic leapfrogging to overtake the old industrialized 
nations to become a global player. When the Chinese economic development will lead to 
a power transition, if it ever will, is unpredictable. But if they are able to sustain their 
current growth and their ways of getting access to needed resources, and maintain 
domestic stability, this goal might be achieved someday.  
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VI. CONCLUSION  
This thesis sought to answer the question of how Japan in the 1970s and 1980s 
and the current People’s Republic of China get access to needed resources, and if these 
approaches can be compared. As oil and gas are the most important fuels for industry, 
which every growing economy needs, the focus has been particularly on these two 
resources.  
Table 1 in the Appendix gives a short summary of the uses, means, and tools the 
two countries studied have employed or continue to employ to access these resources 
beyond their home countries, and relates these methods to the previously described 
international relations theories. 
As is shown here while there might be some sort of liberal-institutional approach 
exhibited by Japan, this is certainly not the case for China. But it is also important to see 
that many of the Japanese approaches were still realist, as they all served the Japanese 
overall goal to overtake the Western nations and become a global economic power. Japan 
has achieved much of this goal. Japan has overtaken the majority of the old industrialized 
world, except the United States. Now even overtaken by China, Japan is still one of the 
leading economic powers in the world. China, by comparison, uses international 
organizations such as the UN and its position within that organization to show a strong 
realist approach. The Chinese were only willing to agree to economic sanctions again 
Iran, for example, after certain conditions were met and when China could not find a 
comparable alternate source of oil and gas. Furthermore, to protect its supply of energy 
resources from Iran, China went so far as to undermine the Western sanctions against 
Iran. This further Chinese power play illustrates its own position to secure national 
interests, as well as the willingness of Western nations to accept these national interests 
and to negotiate and bargain with China accordingly.  
The comparison of the methods the countries use to access foreign countries’ 
resources, however, cannot enable us to predict how China, in particular, will behave in 
future. But this comparison does show the strong national interests which drove both 
countries to use a variety of means to maintain stable energy supplies, as these supplies 
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were most important to support further economic growth. While both countries have 
started to develop technologies and alternative energy sources to decrease their 
dependence on these resources, the need is still there and the means are still used, 
especially in the case of China. The need will further grow and therefore pose a challenge 
to other developing and developed nations as oil and gas become even scarcer in the 
future. How the competition for these resources will develop in the future is also hard to 
predict. But the Chinese approach of non-interference and China’s history as a country 
that has never colonized another country make it possible that China’s position here is 





Table 1.   Comparison of Japan (1970‒1980) and current People’s Republic of China with respect to international relations 
theories. 
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